Iran Needs a Crown, a Constitutional Compact and a Guardian of National Unity

“Why monarchy?” is a question about what Iran is, the continuity of its history, the preservation of its territorial integrity and the future of freedom in our homeland.

For Iran, monarchy is not a worn-out relic of the past, but a living, tested and deeply rooted institution. It has been woven into Iran’s existence for thousands of years and has repeatedly drawn the country’s broken threads together after upheaval, foreign invasion or the threat of disintegration.

Support for monarchy does not spring from blind attachment to the past. It grows from the conviction that, without an enduring national institution above the government of the day, Iran’s future could once again become a prize contested by factions, sects, military forces, theocrats, warlords and those hungry for power.

For us, monarchy is not about returning to yesterday. It is about restoring Iran’s future.

One of the greatest misrepresentations by monarchy’s opponents is to reduce the institution to a single individual, as though monarchy meant nothing more than one person sitting on a throne. Yet before it is a personal office, monarchy is an institution of history, culture and statecraft.

The institution comprises traditions, commitments, values and accepted conventions that connect the people, the government and the country’s history. Monarchs come and go, but the institution endures. Governments change, prime ministers are appointed and removed, and parliaments are renewed; the monarch remains a symbol of national continuity and a guardian of the national compact—the shared constitutional bond between the people and their state.

In a constitutional monarchy, the sovereign is neither an autocratic ruler nor the manager of day-to-day government. Government derives its authority from the people’s vote and is accountable to parliament. The monarch is not a rival to the people, but a guardian of their rights and of the country’s stability against governmental overreach.

Under such a system, governments come and go, but the country does not lose its enduring head of state.

Parties compete, but the symbol of national unity is not worn down by their daily disputes.

The prime minister depends on the electorate and parliamentary support, while the monarch stands apart from allegiance to any party, faction, province, religion, ethnic group or political ideology.

The monarch belongs to all of Iran.

Iran is more than a boundary on a map. It is a shared memory, a culture, a historical experience and a consciousness of national identity. From Iranian mythology and Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh—the great Persian epic—to Cyrus and Darius; from the Iranian kingdoms that followed foreign invasions to the Constitutional Movement and Pahlavi-era modernisation, monarchy has been one of the enduring pillars of Iranshahr: Iran understood as a historical and cultural homeland, not merely a territory.

Monarchy in Iran has changed repeatedly, adapting to the needs of its time and evolving from ancient kingship towards constitutional monarchy. Constitutionalism bound the Crown to a compact between monarch, nation and law. The Pahlavi era likewise sought, on the basis of this idea, to rebuild the modern state, public education, a modern judiciary, a national army, countrywide infrastructure and an Iranian sense of national identity.

The upheaval of 1979 did more than remove a dynasty. It severed a thread linking Iran’s modern state to its history, culture and national identity. The abolition of monarchy also removed one of the most significant barriers to Islamism, religious reaction and the dominance of ideologically driven armed forces.

Amin Sophiamehr’s research presents monarchy as a balancing institution capable of restraining both military overreach and the rise of theocrats. For a country such as Iran, in a region marked by coups, war, Islamism and state collapse, this function is of fundamental importance.

We know the consequences of that rupture through lived experience. Instead of progress, Iran became trapped in war, repression, the emigration of skilled people, currency collapse, environmental destruction, international isolation and rule by state clerics and military forces.

This outcome was not an inexplicable accident. When the central pillar of a house is pulled down, the collapse of the roof should come as no surprise.

For more than four decades, Islamist republicans have sought to make “republic” synonymous with freedom and “monarchy” synonymous with autocracy. That binary fits neither history nor the world today.

Some of the world’s freest, most prosperous, safest and most democratic countries are constitutional monarchies. In those countries, monarchy is not freedom’s enemy, but one of the institutions supporting political stability, national unity and continuity of government.

The studies discussed in the essay “In Defence of Monarchy” likewise challenge the claim that republics are inherently superior to monarchies. Constitutional monarchies have a defensible record in areas ranging from property rights and political stability to public well-being and institutional resilience.

Comparisons within the Middle East are also revealing. Many of the region’s monarchies, despite their shortcomings, have been more stable, more open to reform and more successful in governance than neighbouring republics. By contrast, many Middle Eastern republics have descended into lifelong presidencies, military coups, civil war, Islamism or collapse.

Calling a country a “republic” does not make it free, just as calling it a “monarchy” does not make it autocratic.

What matters is the structure of power, the rule of law, civil liberties, government accountability and the state’s ability to protect its people’s security and well-being. By these measures, constitutional monarchy has not only held its own; in many countries it has shown that freedom and stability can be sustained together.

In a republic, the head of state and head of government are either the same person or both emerge from party-political competition. The country’s highest representative thus also becomes part of political and electoral conflict.

In a constitutional monarchy, by contrast, there is a clear distinction between the enduring state and the government of the day.

The government is tied to a party, a programme and the electorate; the monarch is tied to Iran.

A government can fail and leave office without rupturing the country’s continuity. Parliament can be dissolved and fresh elections held without leaving the nation’s symbolic office vacant. Politicians may dispute economic policy, education, taxation or foreign affairs, but above those disputes the Crown serves as a reminder that Iran is greater than any party or group.

In a constitutional system, the monarch does not run the country; the monarch safeguards its continuity.

The monarch is not a legislator, but a guardian of the constitution.

The monarch is not a party leader, but a symbol of national unity.

The monarch does not decide on the people’s behalf, but safeguards their right to decide freely.

The monarch should reign, not govern.

Iran is a land of diversity. Its languages, dialects, traditions, ethnic communities and ways of life are brought together within a shared history and destiny. To preserve such a country, a government based solely on one party’s temporary ascendancy is not enough.

Iran needs an institution that Kurds and Lurs, Baluch and Azeris, Gilaks and Mazandaranis, Arabs and Persians, believers and non-believers, women and men—all citizens—can regard as their own.

That institution cannot be embodied by a cleric claiming a divine right to rule.

Nor can it be embodied by a commander claiming authority from the barrel of a gun.

Nor can it be embodied by a president elected by only part of the country, who will hand the office to a party rival a few years later.

It must be rooted in history without being captive to the past; national without being partisan; enduring without being autocratic; dignified while remaining subject to the law.

That institution is Iran’s constitutional Crown.

The Islamic Republic is not merely an ineffective or religious republic. It is the product of one of the greatest political deceptions in Iran’s history. In 1979, the word “republic” was wrapped in the promise of freedom and sold to the people. What emerged instead was rule by an Islamic jurist, executions, war, poverty and hostility to Iranian identity.

Supporters of that upheaval overthrew monarchy in the name of freedom, but buried freedom alongside it.

They said the Shah must go so that the people could rule. Instead, a cleric took power who had neither been freely elected by the people nor was accountable to them.

They promised a new republic, but created a country in which the people’s vote is overridden by the Supreme Leader under the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist.

They promised independence, but turned Iran into a sphere of influence for Russia, China and proxy groups.

They promised justice, but drove the divide between rich and poor, the plunder of public assets and the privileges enjoyed by regime insiders to unprecedented levels.

Iran’s economic record also reveals this rupture. The data discussed in Dr Saeed Ghasseminejad’s essay show that Iranian per capita income rose rapidly in the final decades of the Pahlavi monarchy, then fell after the revolution and failed for decades to regain its earlier trajectory.

The republic born of the 1979 upheaval did not merely abolish monarchy; it also broke Iran’s path towards progress.

Some ask why the Crown should be hereditary. The answer lies in the nature of the office itself.

If a monarch, too, reached office through electoral competition, party backing and campaign spending, the monarch would no longer stand above the parties. To secure the position, that person would have to make promises, gather supporters, attack rivals and incur debts to political or financial backers.

Such a person would no longer be the country’s impartial symbol, but another politician among politicians.

Hereditary succession within a constitutional framework keeps the Crown apart from political bargaining, party conflict and electoral deal-making. The heir is prepared from youth for a national responsibility without having to obtain it through deceiving voters, buying support or striking bargains with pressure groups.

A hereditary Crown does not mean hereditary governing power. Sovereign authority belongs to the people and is exercised under the law. What passes by inheritance is the symbolic office charged with safeguarding the country and the continuity of the national state.

Constitutional monarchy is not the restoration of an autocratic court. It must rest on a modern constitution, an elected parliament, an independent judiciary, free media, equality between women and men, separation of religion and state, and unconditional respect for citizens’ rights.

The monarch must not be able to make laws unilaterally.

The monarch must not be able to impose a preferred government on the people.

The monarch must not be able to treat public property as a personal possession.

The monarch must not replace parliament, the courts or the people’s vote.

The monarch’s strength in a constitutional system comes from remaining outside day-to-day politics. Because the monarch does not seek to control the government, the office can safeguard orderly transitions between governments. Because the monarch is not an electoral candidate, the office can represent all voters. Because the monarch is not tied to a party, the office can call all political forces back to the constitution and the country’s unity in a crisis.

The Crown is worthy of respect only when it is subject to the law.

After the Islamic Republic, Iran will need more than a change of government. It will need to rebuild its institutions. The national state must be reconstructed; law must take precedence over ideology; the military must be released from defending a creed and return to protecting the homeland’s borders; religion must recover its place as a matter of personal freedom; and Iranian citizens must once again be treated with dignity in their own country.

This reconstruction will be difficult without a strong, national and inclusive symbol.

Constitutional monarchy can provide a bridge between historical Iran and a free Iran of the future. The Crown can serve as a reminder that the Islamic Republic is not the whole of Iran, but a dark and temporary rupture in its history. The Lion and Sun flag can likewise show once more that Iran existed before this regime and will endure after it.

Restoring monarchy means reviving a home-grown institution for freedom, unity and stability—one derived neither from imported totalitarian blueprints, nor from theocracy, nor from the wishes of foreign powers.

Monarchy arose from the depths of Iran’s own history.

Support for monarchy places Iran above parties, sects and temporary governments. Freedom collapses without stability, while stability without a national institution can fall into the hands of autocrats. Constitutional monarchy prevents the head of state from being reduced to the leader of a party, a religion, an ethnic group or an armed force.

The constitutional Crown is a guardian of the law, not its replacement. Iran needs a symbol that embodies thousands of years of history, territorial integrity and the shared future of its people.

The upheaval of 1979 separated Iran from its historical identity. The return of the Crown can be Iran’s return to itself.

We do not seek a Crown to rule over the people. We seek it to safeguard Iran.

A monarch for Iran. The law for everyone. Government in the hands of the people.

Long live the King. May Iran endure.